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Abstract
This article deals with the relationship between law, morality and communal mores with particular 
reference to the protection o f  pre-natal life in South Africa. It is argued that personal, moral choice 
influences com m unal mores and that these mores can, in turn, be transformed into legal norms, 
thus becoming part o f  the legal system.
It is pointed out that South African law lends insufficient protection to foetal life - especially in 
situations where it stands to be destroyed as a result o f  abortion. It is then suggested that the legal 
subjectivity o f  the foetus should be recognized and that every application fo r  an abortion should be 
heard by a court o f  law or, alternatively, a specialist tribunal. The foetus should be represented at 
these proceedings by a curator ad litem.
It is finally argued that the proposed arrangement will not unduly encroach on the moral freedom  
o f the individual and that personal, moral choice and com munal mores will still be o f  decisive 
significance in regulating 'bio~ethical* morality.
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Law, morality and social interaction (from which communal mores emanate) are 
modes of being (and experience), the very essence of which cannot be defined, but is 
perceived intuitively.^ What can be defined though, are the beings themselves: a tree,
’ H .G . S toker (1967:239-243) is o f the opinion th a t the d iaphancrotic  m ethod o f intuitive 
perception is best suited to help one gain insight into the essential nature of something. It is a 
phenomenological method of ‘looking into’ (i.e. examining and ‘seeing’) the innermost nature 
(or root) of something, in casu a mode of existcncc. That which is examined, say for instance A, 
‘reveals itselP to the person who is examining, provided that non-As are, for the tim e being, 
functionally abandoned from the view of him or her who examines. There must be, as Stoker 
would put it, a "selektief-relevante afsien van" (i.e. a selectively relevant abandonment of) non-As.
H erm an Dooyeweerd (1969:472-485 and Encyclopaedic 3-4) also opts for intuition as an active
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the State, legal norms, moral conduct etc. The exception here is the human being: a 
human being him- or herself cannot reflect on ‘being human’ in its totality and can 
therefore not acquire the bird’s-eye view needed to define it. At any rate definition, 
even in instances where it is feasible, by and large remains an inadequate method to 
describe any being.
The main focus of this paper are modes o f being (or modalities) - not the beings 
themselves. The topic that will be reflected on is, however, of vital importance to 
human beings. It involves crucial issues (of life and death) which ultimately transcend 
modality.
A theoretical model explaining the relationship between law, morality and communal 
mores will first be developed and will then be applied to matters related to the legal 
protection of pre-natal life.
2. lA W
The law protects. But it does more than that: it secures, it vouches for. Law as a 
distinctive mode of existence is security-in-office. The virtually untranslatable 
Afrikaans says it better: ampsgeborgenheid. Security-in-office and/or ampsgeborgenheid 
cannot be definitions of the law. They are but lingual expressions - in the form of 
catchwords - bringing to light something of the very nature or the uniqueness of law as 
a mode of being: they put into words a ‘given’ or a ‘phenomenon’ which enters the 
human horizon of experience through intuitive cognition or perception.
Law in its uniqueness cannot be defined because definition describes A in terms o f  X, 
Y and Z which are non-As: it combines X, Y and Z into a higher unity and arranges 
them in an orderly way so as to shed light on or ‘say something about’ A. However, the 
really distinctive nature of A (A in its uniqueness) cannot be captured in terms of (the 
higher unity or an orderly arrangement of) non-As.
agent in gaining knowledge of the innermost nature (or meaning-kemel, as he would have it) of 
modes of being (or modalities). He points out that the human intuition is not merely ‘something 
psychologicar but that - as part of the tem poral depth structure of human experience - it also 
has defínite analytical an d /o r theoretical significance.
The method that I use to comc to knowledge of the very nature of modes of being (such as law, 
morality and communal morality) is an adaptation of the diaphanerotic method of Stoker and of 
Dooyeweerd’s view o f the theoretical function of human intuition. For a more comprehensive 
exposition see Du Plessis (1978:640-643).
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2.1 Security-in-office implies:
• Human persons with authenticated status, i.e. people vouched for.
• Norms or rules which authenticate.
• A comprehensive order within which status and normativity interact.
Status, normativity (or regularity) and order interact as correlates', the one implies the 
other(s) and it is only as interdependents that they are incarnated in security-in-office 
which provides the basis for their interaction.
What has thus far been stated can, from an analytic angle, be unraveled as follows:
The law
* provides elbowroom or living-space for the human person-in-office\
* determines the bounds of such elbowroom vis á-vis that of others, and
* vouches for the position, the foothold, of the person-in-office.
‘Office’ is to be understood in a comprehensive and ‘provide’ and ‘vouch’ in a basic 
or a fundamental sense:
* A person’s office encompasses everything relative to his or her position as 
someone who, in this world, exists for a certain purpose, has a definite role to 
play (albeit in various capacities) and needs elbowroom as well as ‘equipment’ 
to do so. ‘Office’ therefore coheres with (and implies) status - and vice versa.
John Rawls (1972:236) captures the basic or fundamental nature of law as a 
socialphenomenon as follows: "... [L]aw defines the basic structure within which 
the pursuit of all other activities takes place."
Coercion can, if and when necessary, be used to maintain law. Coercion in 
relation to the law is, however, as a rule latent - i.e. coercion-in-store - and should, 
ideally speaking, only be actuated once personal status or the legal order itself 
comes under threat, or in instances of reparation.
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3. LAW AND MORALITY
Law differs in principle from morality as the voluntary assumption of responsibility (for 
others).
• The moral counterpart of legal status is individual disposition or inclination,
• that of normative legal authentication, interpersonal persuasion and
• that of legal order personal reliability or troth.
Law tends to be official, external, objective and formal. Morality is dispositional, 
internal, subjective and informal. Law has compulsion in store; morality operates 
through conscience and conviction. However, law and morality do not exist in worlds 
apart. Actually they do not constitute two different spheres’, they are much rather 
impetuses to two different kinds of (social) strategy - the one inclining more to 
compulsion, the other to persuasion. Coercion is the bottom line of law-as-strategy; 
personal choice is that of morality.
A legal strategy is appropriate in instances where human interests in need of ‘basic’ or 
‘official’ protection are at stake; a moral strategy in instances where personal choice is 
not likely to effect the ‘official basis’ of being (purposefully) human, and yet expresses 
the (voluntary) assumption of responsibility for others.
The choice of Mr. A and Ms. B to practice ‘free love’ is, if they happen to be consent­
ing adults, a moral choice, which neither erodes nor improves their basic status as legal 
subjects. In certain instances, however, extra-matrimonial sexual intercourse warrants 
(and even necessitates) legal intervention because interests susceptible to legal 
protection are at stake:
• Should Mr. A have sexual intercourse with Ms. B without her consent, his conduct 
constitutes rape. The law will most definitely intervene. Not only is the integrity 
of Ms. B’s body - as a legally protected interest - violated by this unwarranted 
intrusion, but public interest comes under threat as well: the public at large is 
entitled to legal protection against rapists (such as A) even though (for the time 
being) B as individual has been the only victim of A. Public penance (in the form 
of punishment for his crime) is therefore legally incumbent upon A.
• If an illegitimate child, C, is born from the affair of A and B, the law will vouch for 
the interests of C by, for instance, requiring from A as the natural father of the
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child, to maintain her. The free moral choice of A and B does not, in this instance, 
obviate A’s legal responsibility towards C.
In the last example Mr. A is married. The law protects the integrity of matrimony 
against intrusion by third parties: consortium is a legal interest. Mrs. A can 
therefore claim damages from Ms. B. Furthermore, should Mrs. A institute 
divorce proceedings against her unfaithful husband, the law provides that Mr. A’s 
act of adultery with Ms. B must be taken into account in order to determine 
whether his marriage to Mrs. A has broken down irretrievably. If Mrs. A can 
prove such breakdown, she is entitled to a divorce.
4. COMMUNAL MORES
A basic question remains: Who determines what ‘interests in need of basic or official 
(i.e. legal) protection’ are - and how is it done? I have already alluded to the fact that 
law and morality do not exist in worlds apart. As a matter of fact, the interaction 
between them becomes most visible in what I prefer to call communal mores. These 
mores reflect, at least in part, a communis opinio populis (Afrikaans: gcmeenskaps- 
opvatting) as to the assumption o f responsibility, though not voluntary (as in the case of 
morality), but by mutual agreement. This strategy does not allow for a legal sanction 
which (can) compel (if necessary). Mutual agreement is much rather maintained 
through external social sanction which impels. Impulsion is, in the field of communal 
mores, a foil to legal compulsion on the one hand and moral conscience and conviction 
on the other. Communal mores emanate from social intercourse and interaction and 
therefore imply:
social status, i.e. a particular stand in the community; 
collective persuasion or impulsion, and
• social acceptance
Putting law at the one end of the spectrum and morality at the other, the differences 
(and similarities) between law, morality and communal mores can be presented dia- 
grammatically as follows:
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LAW COMMUNUAL MORES MORAUTY
SECURITY-IN-OFFICE 
BY AGREEMENT
RESPONSIBIUTY
VOLUNTARY
RESPONSIBILITY
Authenticated status Social status Individual disposition
Normativity, regula­
rity, compulsion-in­
store
Collective persuasion 
or impulsion
Interpersonal
persuasion
Order Social acceptance Reliability, troth
It is not necessarily ‘the majority of the people’ who determine what communal mores 
are. The influence exercised by individuals and institutions to help determine them 
depends on the status these determining agents enjoy in the broader community which, 
in turn, accounts for the extent of persuasion which they can exert to win social 
acceptance for their ideas. It is, therefore, not simply a matter of ‘counting heads’. 
And what emerge in the end as communal mores may - and will most probably - not be 
acceptable to every individual in terms of his or her personal moral convictions.
Communal mores are susceptible to change, so that the boundaries between them and 
legal norms keep on shifting - at least within certain confined limits. These limits 
enclose a grey area. It is often therefore no easy task to determine what communal 
mores at a given point in time comprise. This holds, in particular, for those mores 
bordering on law on the one hand and morality on the other.
The more stable and settled a society, the larger the ‘operational area’ of communal 
mores, and the smaller the area in which legal compulsion needs be invoked. Follow­
ing from this: the smaller the area in which legal compulsion is invoked, the larger the 
area for moral choice. An increase in the area of moral choice is therefore inversely 
proportional to an increase in the area of legal compulsion, but directly proportional to 
an increase in the area of communal mores. However, in societies where communal 
choice holds sway over personal choice, an increase in the area of communal mores 
does not necessarily extend the area of personal moral choice. In such societies
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collective impulsion is inclined more to normative compulsion rather than inter­
personal persuasion. In complex, differentiated or ‘open’ societies, on the other hand, 
the tendency is very much the opposite.
The State is the most formal and official institution of authority in a differentiated 
society. It is furthermore charged with the primary responsibility to keep up a public 
order of law within its particular territory. It is for this reason that, in a complex and 
differentiated society, it is regarded as improper for the State as a public institution to 
make moral choices which can best be made at a personal or an individual level. 
There are other social institutions which can educate the individual to make moral 
choices of a certain kind: the family, the church etc. But a State bent on promoting 
the moral convictions of only a certain segment or segments of its population, does not 
exercise its authority in the public interest.
On the other hand the State is bound to interpret communal mores as best it can. It is 
also its duty to continuously ‘inspect’ the shifting borders between law and these mores, 
so as to determine the need for either the deregulation of or further official involve­
ment in certain matters.
5. THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRE-NATAL LIFE
Life cannot be defined scientifically or philosophically. It is one of the fundamentals - 
perhaps the fundamental - of human existence. Other such fundamentals are freedom, 
justice, love, grace etc. For centuries now scholars and philosophers have tried to 
define these fundamentals - without success. Fundamentals can at most be recognizecP 
at the level of intuition, i.e. accumulated experience.
Law protects life. What has appeared to be impossible for philosophers and scholars, 
must therefore be attempted in the field of law: life must be defined in order to 
protect it. A juridical definition of life can at best be an operational definition which 
cannot claim any ultimacy (Platt, 1976:10-11). The most it can say is: ‘This is how life 
is understood for purposes of its legal protection.’ An operational definition must of 
course correspond as closely as possible to the ‘reality’ which it defines - even though it 
cannot purport to be exhaustive.
The law does not define life as such. It has its own operational definition of birth^ and
 ^A nd not perceived as e.g. the essence of modes of being. 
 ^The legal requirements for birth are the following:
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it accepts medical opinion as authoritative testimony of the advent of death."* Life then 
for purposes of the law, will be regarded as the period between birth and death.
Pre-natal life is not defined either. A foetus is taken to be ‘live’ - for purposes of the 
statutory offence of abortion - as from the moment the ovum is fertilized (S. v Collop,
1981 (1) S.A. 150 (A) 163G-H; Lupton, 1988:207). The question whether a foetus was 
alive in a particular instance, will be decided with reference solely to medical opinion. 
Note that neither ‘quickening’ of the foetus nor a certain lapse of time after ferti­
lization is required before, in law, a foetus is considered ‘alive’ (Hunt, 1970:313).5
In South Africa it is generally accepted that pre-natal life is an ‘interest’ worthy of legal 
protection. Its destruction by way of abortion procured through human intervention is 
a crime (see section 10(1) read with sections 1, 3(l)(a)-(d), 5 and 6(1) of the Abortion 
and Sterilization Act 2 of 1975)^ except in the following circumstances:
* The /oe íu j/ch ild  must be separated from the body of the m other (it is not required that 
the umbilical cord must have been cut).
* The child must have lived after separation - if only for a moment.
* Som e authors also add that the child must have been viable, but there  is no general 
agreem ent as to this requirement.
See in general Barnard, Cronjé & Olivier, 1986:9-10; Boberg, 1977:8-9;
Van der Vyver & Joubert, 1985:62-64.
* Traditionally death is associated with the cessation of the functions of the brain (somatic death) 
as manifested in the cessation of the vital functions of the heart and lungs. This traditional view 
has, however, becom e problematic. It is now possible to sustain the function of the heart and 
the lungs even after the brain has ceased to function.
See in general Barnard, Cronjé & Olivier, 1986:22-23; Boberg, 1977:22-24; Van der Vyver & 
Joubert, 1985:418-420 and Du Plessis, 1976:13-14.
^ In Roe V Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) the United States Supreme Court held that a mother has a 
right to abortion up to the stage when the foetus becomes viable, i.e. normally after 28 weeks of 
pregnancy but in favourable circumstances as early as 24 weeks after conception. The court 
thereby settled the question of the protection of a foetal right to life vis-á-vis a m aternal right to 
abortion, but nevertheless (a t 159 of the report) consciously and deliberately refrained from 
expressing an opinion as to when human life begins.
* Abortion is defmed in section 1 of the Act as "the abortion of a live foetus of a woman with the 
intent to kill such foetus". The penalty for the crime of abortion is a fine not exceeding R5 000 
or imprisonm ent for a period not exceeding five years or both such fine and im prisonm ent - 
section 10(1).
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* Where continued pregnancy endangers the pregnant woman’s life (section 3(l)(a)) 
or
* constitutes a threat to her physical (section 3(l)(a)) or
* mental health (section 3(l)(b)).
* Where there is a serious risk that the child to be born will suffer from a physical 
defect or
* a mental defect of such a nature that it will be irreparably seriously handicapped 
(section 3(l)(c)).
* Where the foetus has allegedly been conceived as a result of rape'^ or
* incest (section 3( 1 )(d))® or
* intercourse outside wedlock ("illegitimate carnal intercourse" - see the definition in 
section 1) "and the woman is, due to a permanent mental handicap or defect 
unable to comprehend the consequential implications of or bear the parental 
responsibility for the fruit of coitus" (section 3(l)(e)).
A lawful abortion can only be procured subject to compliance with a number of rather
strict requirements (see in general sections 3 and 6).
The attitude of South African jurists to existing abortion laws vary. On the one hand
there are those who think that the Act goes too far in decriminalizing a b o r t i o n O n
’  Snyman (1984:39)1 points out that, strictly speaking, only a woman who has been raped by a 
person who can be held criminally responsible for his conduct, will be entitled to an abortion. If 
the ‘rap is t’ cannot be held criminally responsible for his actions, carnal intercourse with a 
woman without her consent does not amount to ‘rape’ in its legal sense and therefore in the 
sense in which it is used in the section. This state of af^fairs is untenable ("as far as the woman is 
conccrned, the man’s mistake is irrelevant") and Snyman suggests an amendment of the relevant 
provision so as to allow for a lawful abortion in these circumstances.
® Incest is defined in s 1 of the Act as "carnal intercourse between two persons who are related to 
cach other and by reason of such relationship incompetent to marry cach other". This definition 
does not refer to incest as a crime (only) and the problem which exists with respect to rape can 
therefore not arise with respect to incest - Snyman, 1984:391.
’  Bertrand (1978:277) for example writes;
"In the light of medical knowledge about the developm ent of foetal life and the diminishing 
num ber o f actual medical indications for abortion, liberal abortion is discrimination against 
unborn children on the grounds o f age, size or shape. T he South A frican A bortion  Act, 
although relatively conservative, embodies an attack on the sanctity of human life. By what valid 
standards can the process be stopped, so that this discrimination is not (logically) extended to 
apply also to  people after birth? Once the sanctity of human life is degraded, society stands at 
the top of a slippery slope that could lead to abortion on demand (of the m other), voluntary 
mercy killing (at the request of the patient), abortion on command (of the Stale), obligatory 
mercy killing of handicapped people (a scientific inquisition), and, ultimately, with increasing
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the other hand there are those who advocate a so-called liberalization of abortion 
legislation in South Africa so that medically safe abortions will be available more freely
- and perhaps even on demand (Kunst & Meiring, 1982:264-266). There are also a 
variety of views in between.lO
Public opinion in South Africa seems to favour lawful abortion on the grounds 
presently provided for by the Act and is against abortion for socio-economic reasons 
(Venter, 1981:131-141). According to Kunst & Meiring (1982:264), however, the 
results of certain opinion surveys seem to indicate support for the ‘liberalization’ of 
abortion legislation.
5.1 The Rall-case
In the case of Christian League o f Southern Africa v Rail, 1981 (2) S.A. 821 (O) the 
question arose whether a threatening infringement of the right to life of a foetus can be 
prevented by obtaining (on its behalf) an interdict averting or reducing the threat. In 
normal circumstances a person ‘comes into being’ for purposes of the law - i.e. 
becomes a legal subject - at birth. The rule nasciturus pro iam natu habetur quotiens de 
commodo eius agitur (‘the unborn is taken to have been born if it would be to its 
advantage’) is a common law measure predating a person’s legal subjectivity to the 
date of conception. One of the questions that had to be answered in the Rail case was 
whether this rule provides a legal basis for protecting the life of a nasciturus.
The respondent, a Miss Rail, sought an abortion in terms of section 3(l)(d) of the 
Abortion and Sterilization Act {supra) alleging that her pregnancy had resulted from 
rape. The applicant in the matter, the Christian League of Southern Africa, approach­
ed the court for the appointment of a curator ad litem, who could represent the foetus 
in all matters relating to the abortion sought by the respondent. As an organization
technology and tolalitarianism, to  a socio-political inquisition whereby an elite in society will 
have complete authority and control over our very life and lives" (also see Van Zyl, 1979:134- 
141).
'°L up ton  for exam ple (1985:99; also see 1988:197-215) argues that there  is no difference in 
principle between a newly created embryo on the one hand and a separate sperm and ovum on 
the other. There should therefore be no legal impediments to destroying such an embryo. He 
does not advocate abortion on demand though, but nevertheless foresees that once the artiTicial 
womb will be perfected, non-foetocidal termination of pregnancy on demand should be allowed 
during the first trim ester of pregnancy. The foetus can then be placed in the artificial womb and 
allowed to develop fully until the time of its ‘birth’.
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promoting Christian faith, morals and ethics the applicant further alleged that it had an 
interest in the matter since its objects included, amongst others, the protection of 
human life. The court refused the application with costs for in essence the following 
three reasons:
* The applicant could not convince the court that it had an interest in the matter 
and, at any rate, the conduct which the respondent sought to interdict was not 
unlawful.
* The ‘nasciturus fiction’ does not confer legal subjectivity on the foetus.^
* Finally, in relation to the question of a curator ad litem, the court concluded that at 
any rate the Abortion and Sterilization Act (supra) itself provides for procedures 
(and for criminal sanctions) which adequately protect a foetus. There is therefore 
no need for the appointment of a curator ad litem to represent the foetus in 
proceedings aimed at aborting and destroying it.
F.C. Steyn J’s judgment evoked interesting and directly conflicting comments (see for 
example Bedil, 1981:462-466; Davel, 1981:361-363; Van der Vyver, 1981:305-314; 
Verster, 1981:153-164). Davel (1981:363) acclaimed the court’s hardly disguised hint 
at the meddlesome in society. Van der Vyver (1981:305), on the other hand, made a 
scathing attack on what he regarded as the court’s subversion of Christian morality.
"L .C . Steyn, J. inter alia relied on an opinion expressed by H ahlo (1974:73-83) that in South 
African law "the child in the womb" has no "right to life which can be enforced by its father, in 
his capacity as its (future?) natural guardian or amicus appointed by the court" (1974:75).
Jurists are not agreed on the real nature of the protection which the nasciturus doctrine affords, 
some referring to it as a fiction while others call it a rule. The fiction proponents argue that 
through the application of the doctrine the birth of an unborn child is predated fictitiously to the 
tim e of its conception. No real legal subjectivity is, according to this view, conferred on the 
nasciturus before its birth, and its rights and interests are said to be potential: they are kept in 
abeyance until Ihe lime of birth (Barnard, Cronjé & Olivier, 1986:12-13; Smit, 1976:212-213 and 
360-361).
On the o ther hand there are those who m aintain that the application o f the nasciturus rule 
actually amounts to predating the legal subjectivity of the foetus and that the rights and interests 
which are protected in the period between conception and birth are real. Accordingly there is, 
so it is argued, no need for a fiction (Van der Vyver & Joubert, 1985:68-69 and Van der Vyver, 
1984:8).
The judgment of L.C. Steyn, J. in the Rail case endorses the former view while the latter view is 
compatible with the notion of protection of pre-natal life.
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The Rail judgment can be criticized on legal g rounds.12  I do not want to deal with 
these at great length. Just two observations:
S.1.1 Refusal to extend the luucifttfus rule
The court justifies its refusal to extend the nasciturus rule to instances where the 
protection of pre-natal life is sought in inter alia the following terms:
W aar die ongebore vrug nic lewend gcborc word nie is daar geen sprake van enige rcgte wat 
horn tocval nie en k leef geen regte  aan hom, op  grond w aarvan gesé kan word dat by ’n 
regsubjek is nie ... W aar die ongebore vrug se ‘regte’ met hom sterf, is daar ook geen ruim te vir 
die uitbreiding van die nasdtunu-flksie tot die beskerming teen vrugafdrywing nie (830A-B).
5.1.2 Requirements for the application of the nasciturus rule
Usually the application of the nasciturus rule is made subject to the following three
requirements:
* Predating legal subjectivity must be to the advantage of the person concerned.
• Such advantage must have accrued after the date of conception.
* The beneficiary must eventually be born alive.
The dictum refers to the second requirement above.
The court’s line of reasoning in this regard has prompted Verster (1981:155-159) to
argue as follows:
• The ‘nasciturus fiction’ protects the rights of the foetus conditional upon its 
eventual birth.
* At birth its legal subjectivity is accordingly predated to the moment when the 
benefit actually accrued.
• Should the appointment of a curator ad litem be premised on legal subjectivity, a 
nasciturus who is to be aborted and killed, can never become entitled to the 
services of a curator, since its chances of being born alive are destroyed.
am in no way suggesting that legal and other objections (e.g. moral objections) can and should 
be seen in isolation from one another.
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I agree with Van der Vyver (1981:306) that this argument comes close to implying that 
since a person who is murdered loses his or her legal subjectivity and can therefore not 
enforce any rights against the murderer after the murder, it is also impossible for the 
victim to take preventive measures against the murderer before the murder.
5.2 Protection and rights of the unborn
Verster (1981:159-162) correctly points out that the court in refusing to appoint a 
curator ad litem disregarded the well-established practice of our courts to appoint 
curatores ad litem in matters which concern the unborn - sometimes even prior to 
conception!i3 He makes extensive reference to cases dealing with the protection of 
proprietary rights and interests of the unborn. Ex parte Bester, 1951 (1) S.A. 774 (T) is 
a telling (and in the present context also to the point) example. In this case the court 
ordered the appointment of a curator ad litem to represent an unborn child in proceed­
ings where the annulment of the marriage of its mother was sought. The court held 
that the child to be born had an interest in the matter, since setting aside the mother’s 
marriage, will brand the child illegitimate at birth.
The Rail case will remain a source of controversy since jurists’ appreciation of it is 
bound to be affected by their (varying) views of a matter as fundamental as the true 
nature and value of human life - albeit pre-natal or ‘potential’ life. Pivotal to this 
debate is the question whether legal subjectivity can in certain circumstances come into 
existence before birth. This question in turn hinges on how a person perceives the 
nature of ‘the human personality’ during the various stages before birth.
Be it as it may, the protection of foetal life is not only a matter of making a moral 
choice. It is also incumbent upon the guardians of law and order in society: pre-natal 
life is an interest worthy of legal protection. A State involving itself in the protection 
of unborn life is not meddling in the private affairs of its citizens. Nor is it making 
moral choices which can best be made at a personal level. It is protecting life which is 
its legal duty - a duty which, with due respect, was not adequately observed by the court 
in Rail’s case. My observations in this regard are of course based on an own - 1 would 
suggest distinctly Christian - view of the nature of life as such and pre-natal life in 
particular. Let me elaborate.
Life is not simply a clinical phenomenon. It is true that, since no universally conclusive
'^Van dcr Vyvcr (1981:310-311) .strongly supports this contention.
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definition of life exists, the law and other disciplines availing themselves of their own 
working definitions of life (see above), have to rely heavily on medicine to assist them 
in establishing the presence or absence of life in particular instances. From this it does 
not necessarily follow that clinical definitions of life are either impeccably reliable or 
final. On the contrary, they are working definitions too. They focus on one or two 
aspects of life only; its biological and perhaps its psychological dimension.!'* Life, 
however, comprises more than an interplay of biological and psychological processes: 
it is the nodal point of our very being in its totality. It ties the human being to a 
diversified reality. To breathe, to eat, to feel and to have a heartbeat, is to live. To 
earn a living, to enjoy beauty, to create culture, to be involved in social relationships, to 
love and be loved and to worship is to live too. And to be secure in doing all these 
things, to be vouched for, is the right of every human being. It is a basic right, a right 
pertaining to the nodal point of all these things: to life itself. At this level of security 
the law comes in - and it has a duty to step in.
What about pre-natal life? Is it not also much more complicated than the biological 
functions of a foetus? Has the foetus not got an own standing in (for example) the 
family into which it is to be born? Does it not have an own way of communicating with 
the outside world - albeit through the medium of its mother, who at any rate fulfils a 
major role in assisting the maintenance of its vital functions? Potentiality or 
expectation is characteristic of foetal life. Birth is the fulfilment of one of the most 
vital expectations of the foetus. With the post-natal human being the element of 
potentiality, however, remains - vividly so at infancy and perhaps less salient in old age. 
Birth is not the beginning of life; it is simply a far-reaching change in lifestyle.
Clinical evidence bears out what has just been said. As medical knowledge of the 
foetus increases, its individuality and humanness becomes increasingly obvious, from a 
very early stage of its development.
The law must take account of all of this - not only of medical facts about the foetus, but 
also of pre-natal life as a mode of being in its fullness. The law must vouch for the 
foetus since it is called upon to vouch for people, for human beings. There is no
■‘'Levcnstcin (1988:11-17) and Kriel (1986) both point out that conventional medicine draws on 
the assum ptions of D escartes and Newton that the world and humans in it function as m ere 
machines. The human being is therefore seen as an organism comprised of various parts which 
function  like the  pa rts  o f a m achine. Life, then , would begin w hen the  m achine s ta rts  
functioning p roperly  (and that is controversial) and it would end when the m achine stops 
functioning (and that is controversial too). A t any rate, any dermition of Hfe (or death) based on 
these assumptions, are bound to be one-sided and, for that reason, inaccurate and inadequate.
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difference in principle between criminalizing murder and culpable homicide on the 
one hand and abortion on the other. It is rather a matter of degree relative to the 
development and potential of the human being. Pre-natal and post-natal life are both 
life and ought to be respected and protected as such.i^
The South African law relating to the protection of unborn life is nevertheless seriously 
deficient in mainly two respects.
First, as stated previously (in 5.1.1 above), there is no reason why in certain 
circumstances and for private law purposes legal subjectivity cannot be conferred upon 
an unborn person by virtue of the nasdturus rule. I think that the time has arrived for 
our courts to settle this matter once and for all and to overrule the patently incorrect 
judgment of L.C. Steyn J in Christian League o f Southern Africa v Rail (supra).
In the second place the situation which arose in the Rail case highlights the need for 
reform of our abortion legislation in general. Given the nature of pre-natal life, I am 
uneasy about some of the grounds on which a lawful abortion can be procured, 
particularly those going beyond necessity and making it possible for one human being 
to sit in judgement on the quality of life of another ... who cannot defend itself.
The Abortion and Sterilization Act should provide for judicial proceedings in each 
instance where an abortion on anyone of the grounds provided for is sought. The 
person seeking the abortion should be required to bring an application to either a 
court of law or a specialist tribunal. Provision should be made for the automatic 
appointment of a curator at litem to look after the rights and interests of the unborn 
child in the course of such proceedings. The proceedings should be adversary in nature 
and the curator should have the right to cross-examine witnesses. This is the least the 
law can do to recognize the personality of the unborn child in the process of making a 
decision which goes to the root of its continued existence.
' ^ h e  law of course operates within certain limits and it must often confess its own powerlcssness 
to cater for all situations. It can for instance hardly protect a pre-implantation embryo. In the 
normal course of events it will be difTicult to prove that an embryo was destroyed as a result of, 
for exam ple, preventing im plantation through the use of a intra-uterine device. Normally a 
signiricant num ber of pre-im plantation  em bryos arc expelled spontaneously anyway. The 
capacity o f the law to secure life is co-dctcrm incd by the extent to  which a living being is in 
communication with - and integrated into - its environment. With the pre-implantation embryo 
an adequate degree of communication and integration is wanting.
**I share the views o f Bertrand which were quoted extensively in footnote 9 above. (I am also 
aware of the fact that 1 most probably have communal mores ‘against’ me.)
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William Me Fee (quoted by Tripp, 1970:81.5) once said the following about birth:
There is nothing like a start, and being born, however pessimistic one may becom e in later 
years, is undeniably a start.
The gist of my argument is that every unborn human being has a basic right to this 
start. A true liberalization of abortion legislation will have to entail the intensified 
protection of such a right - not its increased subversion.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In § 2-4 above a theoretical model expounding the relationship between law, morality 
and communal mores was developed. Can this model tell Christians how to help 
improve the (deficient) South African law regarding the protection of pre-natal life? 
In a sense it cannot: models simply do not provide final and conclusive solutions to 
problems, but simply help us understand these problems in terms of an own {in casu: 
Christian) paradigm. In another sense, however, understanding a problem assists one 
in opting for an appropriate strategy to tackle it.
We must for instance be aware of the fact that, in order to redress the deficiencies of 
our law in the long term, communal mores will have to be influenced by swaying public 
opinion. An awareness of the preciousness of human life and, in particular, pre-natal 
life, must be instilled into the consciousness of a nation comprised of 70% Christians.
To achieve this, Christians themselves will have to be credible by being consistent. 
Hostility to the very notion of human rights - like that displayed in comments on the 
Report on Group and Human Rights of the South African Law Commission in Die 
Kerkblad of 13 September 1989 (Anon., 1989:7-8)1'^ - or indifference to human rights 
issues in general, are for instance inconsistent with a genuine (and moreover credible) 
concern for the rights of the unborn.
The maturity and, indeed, ‘morality’ of a legal system become visible in its protection 
of the rights and interests of the socially weak and vulnerable. The need for such 
‘special’ protection is underscored on several occasions in the Old Testament too. Pre­
'^ It should, however, be pointed out that the compatability of the notion of hum an rights with 
C hristian  fa ith , is curren tly  endorsed  by m ost C hristian  (and  re fo rm ed) denom inations 
throughout the world - see e.g. R.E.S., 1983. The comments in Die Kerkblad, therefore, reflect 
the concerns of a reactionary minority rather than Christians in general.
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natal life is the most vulnerable form of human life, and its protection therefore calls 
for a special effort. It is ironic that so many ‘civilized’ legal systems, professing to be 
bent on the meticulous protection of the rights and, in particular, the right to life of 
‘post-natal’ individuals, are so obviously slack in vouching for foetal life, the most 
vulnerable form of human life. Some legal systems even play an active and decisive 
role in facilitating its destruction!
It is equally ironic that in South Africa Christians who profess to respect the sanctity of 
human life and who hold strong views with respect to the protection of pre-natal life, 
vociferously defends a system threatening and oppressing socio-politically vulnerable 
forms of life. Granted, Die Kerkblaifs fulmination against the idea of human rights can 
hardly pass as representative of mainstream Christian-reformed thinking on human 
rights. It is rather (and at most) a distinctly narrow, ill-informed and outdated version 
of ‘reformed theology’. However, this is not how people ‘from outside’ perceive it. 
They see Christians who what they say today they contradict tomorrow. This is in no 
way conducive to efforts aimed at enhancing public respect for the sanctity of pre-natal 
life.
Hardly any issue of life can be said to be ‘purely moral’. This, as a matter of fact, holds 
for all bio-ethical issues. But this does not imply that in the field of bio-ethics no room 
is left for personal, moral choice. On the contrary, since legal coercion is coercion-in- 
store (see § 2 above) the vast majority of ‘bio-ethical situations’ are regulated rather by 
way of moral choice or communal mores. The law steps in either in instances where 
these less coercive means of regulation fail or where there is a need for defining the 
status of people (or people-to-be) at a basic level. Personal responsibility is therefore 
never excluded.
John F. Kennedy once said that "the protection of our rights can endure no longer than 
the performance of our responsibilities" (Tripp, 1970:804.10). My rights are in other 
words secure to the extent that 1 assume responsibility for the rights of others - 
especially the weak and the defenseless. In a society where the rights of the weak are 
readily trampled on, it is easy for anyone to become one of the weak ... involuntarily. 
This is worth remembering - even if only for purely pragmatic reasons.
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